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i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CLYDE L. MEDLOCK, 
Defendant-Appellant• 
Case No. 14372 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Clyde L. Medlock, appeals from a 
jury verdict of guilty of distribution of a controlled 
substance for value (heroin) in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury by the Honorable 
Gordon R. Hall on November 19, 197 5, was found guilty of 
selling narcotics and sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the conviction• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was approached by Denise Giersz, a 
civilian undercover narcotics agent of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, on July 31, 197 5, near the West Side 
Hotel (T-35). The two, observed by Officer James R. 
Lewis of the narcotics division of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, entered the hotel (T-12) and when 
Ms, Giersz reappeared on the street shortly thereafter, 
she walked to the nearby surveillance car of Officer 
Michael D. Roberts, also of the narcotics division. 
In her mouth was a bag of heroin (T-61), which she 
testified appellant had sold to her, purchased with the 
$20.00 Officer Roberts had given her in the car, just 
before her alighting to meet the appellant, (T-3 6,37) 
who was subsequently arrested, tried, and convicted of 
selling Ms, Giersz that heroin-filled balloon. 
Ms. Giersz had at her request met with Officer 
Roberts and Lewis on July 13, 197 5, to discuss the 
possibility of her working as an undercover agent for 
the Department (T-9,10,11). On acceptance, she was 
explained all procedures relating to her job, i.e. 
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body searches before and after narcotics purchases, 
necessity of keeping her in sight as long as possible 
when she was making a buy, vehicle search if she used 
her car to make purchases (T-10,11). After Ms. Giersz 
became an agent, she was given a daily stipend to help 
maintain her; however, once legal proceedings began against 
persons from whom she had purchased narcotics and her 
safety became even more jeopardized, Ms. Giersz was 
placed on total maintenance in an apartment - with 
food, shelter, and methedone provided at no charge 
(T-62,66). 
Before leaving the police station to meet with 
appellant on July 31st, Ms. Giersz and her clothes were 
thoroughly searched. No drugs were found (T-7). On 
returning to Officer Robert's car, she was taken back 
to police headquarters for another search, which 
revealed no hidden drugs or money (T-8). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's only contention is that the unsavory 
character of Ms. Giersz, argumented by her questionable 
veracity and her interest in the trial's outcome, 
negated the probative value of her testimony; since 
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appellant would not have been convicted without her 
testimony, he argues that the judge should not have 
even submitted the case to the jury, as reasonable 
men could not have found appellant guilty. 
Respondent rejects completely this analysis. 
In our criminal justice system, the court determines 
the admissibility of evidence, and the jury decides 
its credibility. Once a court has determined a witness 
to be competent and his testimony admissible, the jury 
begins its task of sifting out the truth, considering 
factors such as bias and unreliability which detract 
from the witness1 truthfulness. The judge does not 
decide believability. 
"The very essence of trial by jury is that the 
jury are the exclusive judges of the weight of the 
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the 
facts to be found therefrom." State v. Sullivan, 6 
Utah 2d 110 307 P.2d 212, 215 (1957). 
That part of the argument which in substance 
declares that the account related by appellant is more 
deserving of belief than the account related by Ms, 
Giersz, in effect is a jury argument, Msince the jurors 
are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence and 
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credibility of witnesses." State v. Moore, 111 Utah 
458, 183 P-. 2d 973, 977 (1947). Ms. Giersz1 testimony 
was buttressed by that of Officers Lewis and Roberts 
and Ms. Tueller, who conducted the body searches upon 
Ms. Giersz. The jury quite simply believed Ms. Giersz 
and did not believe appellant, a choice they are em-
powered to make. 
"The jury could, and undoubtedly 
did, consider the weaknesses in the 
State's case above referred to. On 
the other hand, it was not only 
their privilege but their duty and 
responsibility to survey the whole 
evidence. In doing so they could 
also properly consider the strength 
and consistencies in the evidence of 
the State and all reasonable inferences 
and intendments fairly and naturally 
arising therefrom in determining where 
they believed the ultimate truth lay." 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 20, 110, 307 
P.2d 212, 215 (1957). 
Contrary to the argument of counsel for appellant, 
the evidence presented by defendant was not such that 
reasonable minds would be compelled to acquit that 
defendant. The defendant presented no evidence in 
conflict with the testimony of Ms. Giersz and other 
state witnesses on any material issue, which reasonable 
minds would be compelled to believe rather than the 
testimony of witnesses for the State. There was ample 
competent evidence to support the verdict. 
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It is important to point out that a jury ver-
dict must stand unless it appears that the evidence 
was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds must have entered reasonable doubts that the 
crime was committed. State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 
350 P.2d 146 (1960), reaffirmed in State v. Allgood, 
28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P.2d 269 (1972). In other words,^ 
the strong presumption is that a jury verdict is 
correct. Appellant, to prevail, has the burden of 
proving that the jury verdict was unreasonable and 
this he has failed to do. 
Furthermore, when evidence is viewed on appeal, 
it is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959) 
reaffirmed in State v. Georgeopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 
53, 492 P.2d 1353 (1972). As the Utah Supreme Court 
has said: 
". . . the correct pattern of 
procedure on appeal • . . is. . . 
to respect the prerogative of 
the jury as the exclusive judge 
of the credibility of the facts. 
Consequently, we assume that they 
believed the Statefs evidence, and 
we survey [the evidence] together 
with all fair inferences that the 
jury could reasonably draw there-
from, in the light most favorable 
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to their verdict." State v. 
Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 294, 422 
P.2d 196 (1967). 
The verdict in this case, being both reasonable 
and proper, ought to be allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent urges that the conviction of the 
appellant be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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